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 Abstract 
 
 The June 1999 and January 2001 proposals by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to include borrowers' credit ratings in assessments of the 
adequacy of banks' capital have heightened general interest in the credit rating industry:  Who the 
industry's firms are; what they do; how they do it; and what the consequences of their actions are.  
This paper uses the structure-behavior-performance paradigm of "industrial organization" to shed 
light on the credit rating industry and to provide a framework for arranging initial observations and 
developing questions for further analysis. 
 A striking fact about the structure of the industry in the U.S. is its persistent fewness of 
incumbents.  There have never been more than five general-purpose bond rating firms; currently 
there are only three.  Network effects -- users' desires for consistency of rating categories across 
issuers -- are surely part of the explanation.  But, for the past 25 years, regulatory restrictions (by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission) on who can be a "nationally recognized securities rating 
organization" (NRSRO) have surely also played a role. 
 A curious part of the behavior of the rating firms is their coverage and their pricing.  
Hypotheses to explain this behavior are explored. 
 Although only limited information on profitability is available, it appears that bond rating is 
quite profitable.  A growing regulatory demand for ratings (for safety-and-soundness regulation by 
bank regulators, insurance regulators, pension fund regulators, and securities regulators) and a 
regulatory limitation on supply surely are contributory factors.  The BIS proposals, if adopted, will 
accentuate these trends for the U.S. and other industrial countries. 
 There is an alternative to these growing regulatory pressures.  It would involve the safety-
and-soundness regulators' becoming more directly involved in regulatory judgments, rather than 
abdicating these judgments to private-sector bond rating firms.  The SEC, and its counterparts 
abroad, could then vacate their roles as the certifier of credit rating firms. 
 These suggestions do not mean that the credit rating firms should be prevented from playing 
a continuing role in helping issuers and investors pierce the fog of asymmetric information in 
financial markets.  But that role should be determined by the market participants themselves, not by 
additional regulation that artificially increases demand and restricts supply.  The latter is a recipe for 
shortages, rents, and distortions.  This is not a welcome prospect. 
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 I.  Introduction 
 
 The June 1999 and January 2001 proposals by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision1 to include borrowers' credit ratings in assessments of the 
adequacy of banks' capital2 have heightened general interest in the credit rating industry:  Who the 
industry's firms are; what they do; how they do it; and what the consequences of their actions are.  
This paper will use the methodology of "industrial organization" to shed light on the credit rating 
industry.3 
 The typical "industrial organization" study of an "industry" uses the structure-behavior-
performance paradigm as its mode of analysis:4  The industry's structure (e.g., numbers of buyers 
                                                           
     * Thanks are due to Rita Bolger, Richard Cantor, Frank Edwards, Sean Egan, Jerome Fons, 
Clifford Griep, James Moser, Hyeyeon Park, Frank Partnoy, Bernard Shull, and Robert Zipf for 
helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
     1 See BIS (1999; 2001a; 2001b).  Since the January 2001 proposal constitutes a revision and 
modification of the June 1999 proposal, I will refer to the January 2001 version as the BIS proposal. 
     2 The borrowers' credit ratings are part of the Basel Committee's "standardised approach to credit 
risk;" see BIS (2001b).  The proposal also permits banks to use "foundation" or "advanced" internal 
ratings-based approaches, depending on the ability of the banks to meet rigorous supervisory 
standards. 
     3 This paper will focus primarily on bond rating firms. 
     4 See, for example, Scherer and Ross (1990) or Carlton and Perloff (1994). 
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and sellers, the degree of seller and buyer concentration, conditions of entry, the extent and 
importance of regulation, etc.) is described and analyzed; the implications of that structure for 
behavior (e.g., pricing, products, advertising, R&D, entry, regulatory behaviors and influences) and 
performance (e.g., profitability, efficiency, regulatory consequences) are predicted; and then 
measures of actual behavior and performance are gathered and compared to the predictions, with 
suitable analysis and discussion. 
 This study of the credit rating industry will explore some of these traditional aspects of 
industrial organization.5  But many of the interesting aspects of this industry transcend these limited 
questions; and data/information limitations are likely to restrict my ability to answer others. 
 Nevertheless, the structure-behavior-performance paradigm will inform this investigation of 
the credit rating industry and provide a framework for arranging initial observations and developing 
questions for further analysis.  It illuminates the special role that government regulation in the U.S. 
has played and continues to play in increasing the demand for the services of the credit rating 
industry while also limiting the supply of credit rating firms.  It also illuminates the ways in which 
the BIS proposal will accentuate this trend. 
 The remainder of this paper will proceed as follows: Section II will briefly discuss the 
rationale for the existence of credit rating agencies. The following sections will then develop the 
structure-behavior-performance themes:  Section III will discuss the structure of the industry: the 
major firms in the industry and some of their characteristics.  A striking feature of this structure is 
the fewness of the number of credit rating firms in any country.  We will offer some hypotheses as 
to the reasons that underlie this fewness.  Section IV will discuss the behavior of the firms in this 
industry: specifically, their pricing and product behavior.  Section V will analyze performance.  
Section VI will address policy -- regulatory -- issues concerning credit rating firms in the U.S.  
                                                           
     5 Other studies of the industry can be found in Ederington and Yawitz (1987), Wilson (1987, ch. 
9), Cantor and Packer (1995), Fridson (1999), Partnoy (1999), and BIS (2000). 
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Section VII will address the BIS proposal and its implications for regulation of credit rating firms.  
And Section VIII will provide a brief conclusion. 
 The discussion in this paper will tend to focus on the credit rating industry in the U.S., since 
information is more readily available for these firms.6  But, wherever possible, the discussion will 
extend to non-U.S. firms as well.  Also, the most attention will be given to rating behavior with 
respect to corporate debt, because more information is available in this area. 
                                                           
     6 Even a study by the BIS (2000), though it developed information about non-U.S. firms, 
provided relatively more information about the U.S. firms. 
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 II.  Why Credit Rating Firms?7 
 
 The historical logic underlying the existence of credit rating firms has clearly resided within 
a basic problem of finance:  How do lenders determine the creditworthiness of potential borrowers 
and assure themselves of the continued soundness of borrowers after a loan has been extended?  
Specialist lenders -- financial intermediaries such as banks and other depositories, insurance 
companies, pension funds, and finance companies -- may be able to develop the necessary 
information themselves, or turn to specialist credit bureaus.  Similarly, when corporations borrow in 
public debt markets -- issue bonds -- many of these same specialist lenders (as well as mutual 
funds) may be able to generate their own information.  But non-specialist lenders -- e.g., the general 
public -- may well need help in developing information about bond issuers; and even specialist 
lenders may want help when they venture beyond their traditional boundaries of lending (e.g., 
lending to new or unfamiliar bond markets). 
 In sum, credit rating firms can help lenders pierce the fog of asymmetric information that 
surrounds lending relationships.8  Equivalently, credit rating firms can help borrowers (and their 
credit qualities) emerge from that same fog.  Further, for bonds -- where hundreds or thousands of 
lenders may hold the debt of a single issuer -- the "public good" nature of information means that a 
                                                           
     7 Standard terminology for the firms in the credit rating industry is to refer to them as "agencies". 
 But this terminology makes them sound as if somehow they are different from other enterprises -- 
they are not -- or they might be part of a "government agency".  To avoid any of these connotations, 
this paper will refer to them as "firms". 
     8 Fridson (1999) proposes a variant on this theme.  Though (he claims) the direct participants in 
bond markets are sufficiently knowledgeable that they do not need credit raters and ratings, he 
recognizes that there are less knowledgeable entities -- e.g., the buyers of bond mutual funds, or the 
claimants of pension funds -- that employ agents (the mutual fund or pension fund managers), and 
the ratings permit the mutual or pension fund shareholders more easily to assure themselves against 
errant behavior by their agents (who commit to investing the shareholders' funds only in bonds that 
are at or above a specified rating).  At its base, Fridson's argument is the same as that in the text. 
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specialized credit rater that disseminates its information can reduce or eliminate the duplication of 
information-generation efforts in which the separate bondholders might otherwise engage, as well 
as allowing holders of small tranches to avoid the high per unit costs that their own investigations 
might require.9 
 This potential role for rating firms, though, begs a logical next-step question:  How does the 
non-specialist bondholder come to trust the judgment of a rating firm?  Here, the long-run 
reputation of the rating firm in its assessments of large numbers of bonds over time -- which surely 
will be a broader experience and exposure than any individual bondholder is likely to have -- must 
be the crucial element in conveying trust to the bondholder. 
 Since the 1930s, however, the presence of a growing regulatory demand for rating services 
in the U.S. has meant that the decisions concerning the incumbent rating firms' fog-piercing 
services have not been solely those of financial markets' participants.  The BIS proposals, if 
adopted, will substantially expand those regulatory demands.  And, since the 1970s, regulatory 
restrictions on supply have tended to favor incumbents over entrants.  Accordingly, though the logic 
of why financial markets might want credit rating firms' assistance in fog piercing remains 
impeccable, the actual practice of regulation has meant that the current presence of the major 
incumbents is no automatic assurance that they continue to meet a market test.  This issue will 
receive extensive treatment in Section VI. 
                                                           
     9 These arguments supporting the logic of a potential role for credit rating firms in financial 
markets can also be found in BIS (2000). 
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 III.  Structure 
 
A.  The United States 
 There are currently three major bond rating firms in the U.S.: Moody's; Standard & Poors 
(S&P); and Fitch.10  Moody's is currently a freestanding company that is highly specialized on rating 
activities.11  S&P's credit rating activities are only part of the larger financial information services 
that are provided by S&P, which in turn is owned by McGraw-Hill.  Fitch is owned by a French 
company, FIMALAC.12 
 Of the three rating firms, Moody's and S&P are by far the largest.  Since Moody's is 
freestanding, data about it (as of 1999/2000) are most readily presented.  These data are found in 
Table 1. 
                                                           
     10 In addition to the three major firms, there are specialized and smaller firms:  A.M. Best 
devotes itself solely to the insurance industry and the ability of insurance companies to honor their 
insurance obligations and their debt obligations; Lace Financial focus on a mix of banks, other 
depositories, and title insurance companies; KMV provides estimates of borrower companies' 
default probabilities for banks, insurance companies, and other lending institutions in North 
America, Europe, and the Pacific rim; and Egan-Jones Ratings Company provides credit ratings 
and research on U.S. corporate debt. 
     11 Moody's was spun off by Dun & Bradstreet in the summer of 2000; Dun & Bradstreet had 
bought Moody's in 1962. 
     12 Until the end of 2000 Fitch referred to itself as Fitch IBCA but now seems to prefer Fitch, 
which will be used in this paper.  Fitch merged with IBCA (a UK firm) in 1997, and the combined 
entity was subsequently bought by FIMALAC.  In June 2000 Fitch bought Duff & Phelps.  As of 
February 2001 Duff & Phelps was still being maintained as a separate brand name, within Fitch.  In 
December 2000 Fitch absorbed Thomson BankWatch. 
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 Table 1: Some Characteristics of the Three Major Bond Rating Firms in the U.S. 
Moody's:13 
 - Annual revenues: $602 million (2000); about 70% arises in the U.S.; about 90% is  
 derived from bond rating 
 - Annual (after tax) net income: $158 million (2000) 
 - Assets: $300 million (2000) 
 - Employees: 1,500, including 700 analysts 
 - Coverage: 
  -- over $30 trillion in debt issuances (ratings and analysis) 
  -- 143,000 corporate, government, public finance issuances 
  -- 4,200 corporate relationships 
  -- 100 countries (offices in 14 countries) 
 
S&P:14 
 - Coverage: 
  -- well in excess of $11 trillion in debt issuances 
  -- more than 38,000 corporate, sovereign, municipal, and financial institution  
   issuers 
  -- more than 98,000 issuances 
  -- more than 86 countries (offices in 16 countries) 
 
Fitch:15 
 - Annual revenues: $260 million (2000) 
 - Employees: 1,100 
 - Coverage: 
  -- 75 countries (offices in 16 countries) 
                                                           
     13 Sources include Fridson (1999), and the Moody's website. 
     14 The sources are Fridson (1999), S&P (1999), and personal communication from S&P 
personnel. 
     15 Source: Fitch website. 
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 The first ratings were issued by Moody's in 1909.  Poor's Publishing Company followed in 
1916, the Standard Statistics Company began issuing ratings in 1922, and the Fitch Publishing 
Company began its ratings in 1924.  Since then the number of U.S. general-purpose rating firms16 in 
existence at any given time has fluctuated only narrowly between three and five. 
 
B.  Outside the U.S. 
 As the data in Table 1 indicate, all three U.S. firms have substantial presences outside the 
U.S.  The survey data in the BIS (2000) report indicate that Moody's and S&P provide extensive 
ratings coverage in Europe; Moody's provides more coverage in Asia than does S&P, but the 
relative coverage is reversed for Latin America. 
 In addition to the major U.S. rating firms, there are at least 35-40 additional credit rating 
firms in operation outside the U.S. that can be readily identified.17  From the BIS (2000) report and 
the affiliates listed by Moody's, S&P, Fitch, and Duff & Phelps, the locations of identified credit 
rating firms that are headquartered outside the U.S. are indicated in Table 2. 
                                                           
     16 This excludes the narrower and smaller firms noted above. 
     17 The BIS (2000) report identifies a total of 28 firms, primarily from the G10 countries, 
including Moody's, S&P, Fitch, and Duff & Phelps.  The report includes the specialized firms, such 
as A.M. Best, KMV, Lace Financial, and Egan-Jones, as well as Dun & Bradstreet, which offers 
credit ratings on millions of firms but does not do specific bond ratings.  The report includes the 
Canadian Bond Rating Service, which was subsequently (October 2000) absorbed by S&P, and 
Thomson BankWatch, which was absorbed by Fitch in December 2000.  The websites of Moody's, 
S&P, Fitch, and Duff & Phelps (prior to its absorption by Fitch) list as affiliates another 20 credit 
rating firms outside the G10.  The report mentions estimates of 130-150 credit rating firms in 
existence worldwide. 
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 Table 2: Headquarters Country and Numbers of Prominent Credit Rating Firms 
 outside the United States 
 
Argentina: 1 
Bangladesh: 1 
Brazil: 1 
Canada: 1 
Chile: 2 
China: 2 
Columbia: 1 
Cyprus: 1 
Egypt: 1 
France: 1 
Germany: 2 
India: 3 
Indonesia: 1 
Italy: 1 
Israel: 1 
Japan: 3 
Korea: 3 
Malaysia: 1 
Pakistan: 2 
Peru: 1 
Russia: 1 
South Africa: 1 
Sweden: 2 
Taiwan: 1 
Tunisia: 1 
Venezuela: 1 
 
Sources: BIS (2000); rating firms' websites 
  
 
10
 Some of the firms listed in Table 2 are national in their focus; others aim for a more global 
presence. 
 
C.  Why So Few? 
 As was mentioned in the Introduction, a striking "fact" about these structural characteristics 
is the fewness of the numbers.  The U.S. currently has only three general-purpose bond rating 
firms18 and has never had more than five in operation at any given time.  India, Japan, and Korea 
have only three; Chile, China, Germany, Pakistan, and Sweden each have only two; the remaining 
countries have only one each.  It is also striking that the U.K., despite its prominence as an 
international finance center, has no bond rating agency headquartered in the country.19 
 The fewness of the number of bond rating firms outside of the U.S. (and the U.K.) is 
probably best explained by the less well developed corporate bond markets in these countries (as 
compared with the U.S.) and hence a lesser need for specialized institutions to help pierce the 
asymmetric information fog in bond markets.20 
 But what about the U.S.?  The fewness of the bond rating firms contrasts sharply with the 
thousands of stock analysts, employed by hundreds of securities firms, who regularly offer opinions 
about companies' equity share price prospects.  Why are there so many of the latter (none of whom 
command the sweeping authority of Moody's and S&P) and so few of the former? 
 First, it is easy to understand why the bond rating firms have chosen to remain separate 
                                                           
     18 Fitch, the third of the three U.S. bond rating firms, is owned by a French company. 
     19 IBCA was originally headquartered in the U.K. 
     20 These countries have tended to stress bank-supplied loans as their sources of finance for 
companies; and, since the countries tend to be more geographically compact than is the U.S. and 
they encouraged nationwide branching, the banks themselves could be effective information 
gatherers. 
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("independent") from the borrowers and lenders themselves.21  This structure minimizes conflicts 
(and appearances of conflicts) of interest.  It is the same principle that keeps Consumers Union as a 
freestanding entity that accepts no advertising in its publication Consumer Reports. 
 But what about fewness?  There are a few possibilities.  First, in 1975 the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated the designation of bond rating firms as "nationally 
recognized statistical rating organizations" (NRSROs).  At the time of the initial designation, the 
SEC "grandfathered" Moody's, S&P, and Fitch.  It subsequently designated Duff & Phelps (1982) 
and McCarthy, Crisanti & Maffei (MCM) (1983) as NRSROs (MCM was absorbed by Duff & 
Phelps in 1991), and designated IBCA (1991) and Thomson BankWatch (1992) as NRSROs for 
banks and financial institutions.  The SEC has not granted the NRSRO designation to any new 
entities since then,22 despite applications by non-U.S. firms.  Indeed, IBCA's frustration with its 
inability to expand its NRSRO designation beyond bank ratings was a major factor underlying 
IBCA's purchase of Fitch in 1997. 
 Regulation, then, is currently limiting entry.23  But this cannot explain the fewness before 
1975.  Instead, the explanation may be partly based on economies of scale and scope and of 
standardization:  Reputation is vital for a bond rating firm.  Reputation gets built by having 
extensive experience with a wide range of bond issues.  And lenders (bondholders) may well prefer 
having only a few standardized ratings and raters, so that the lenders can more readily make 
                                                           
     21 Security Pacific Bank tried to buy Duff & Phelps in 1984, but the Federal Reserve Board 
effectively killed the deal by ruling that the post-merger Duff & Phelps would no longer be able to 
issue public ratings. 
     22 In January 1999 the SEC "upgraded" Thomson BankWatch's status from a specialized 
NRSRO to a general-purpose NRSRO.  In December 2000 Thomson BankWatch was absorbed by 
Fitch. 
     23 The SEC in 1997 proposed formal criteria for designating NRSROs.  It has not finalized any 
action.  I will return to this regulation in Section VI. 
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comparisons of the ratings of issues and issuers based on a relatively straightforward "probability of 
default" judgment on the part of the rater.  By contrast, the process of predicting outcomes for 
equity instruments may well be considerably more complex (since the extent of gain and loss are 
important considerations) and more judgmental; investors may well be more open to varied 
opinions from many sources, none of which command sweeping authority. 
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 IV.  Behavior 
 
A.  Pricing. 
 1.  Who pays?  Until the early 1970s the major credit rating firms earned their incomes by 
selling publications (containing their ratings) and related materials.  In essence, they were charging 
the bondholders for the information provided. 
 In 1970 Moody's and Fitch began to charge the issuers for the ratings; S&P followed suit a 
few years later.24  The bulk of their ratings-related incomes now come from issuer fees. 
 This change in the early 1970s coincides with the spread of low-cost photocopying; the 
issuers were going to have difficulties in preventing free-riding on the publication of their 
information.  Also, in 1970 the default by the Penn Central on $82 million in commercial paper, 
followed by liquidity crises by other short-term issuers and their defaults, was a defining moment 
that focused both issuers and investors on the risks of such issuances.  Issuers were more desirous 
of reassuring nervous investors of the quality of their issuances and actively sought ratings.  
Charging the issuers for the ratings naturally followed.25 
 2.  The structure of fees. 
 Both Moody's and S&P follow similar patterns with respect to pricing and coverage of 
corporate issuances:  They state that they will rate and make public all (or virtually all) SEC-
registered corporate bonds, whether requested or not by the issuer.  If the issuer does not request the 
rating, then the rating firm will simply do the rating on the basis of publicly available information.  
If the issuer requests the rating, then it gets the privilege of sharing its information with the rating 
                                                           
     24 S&P had begun to charge fees to municipal bond issuers in 1968. 
     25 It is worth noting, however, that the smaller rating firms that were noted in Section III charge 
investors and lenders, not issuers, for their ratings.  The BIS (2000) notes that this is a more general 
pattern internationally. 
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firm, but it must pay a one-time fee.  Both Moody's and S&P have the following "list prices" for the 
requested ratings: 3.25 basis points26 on issues up to $500 million, with a minimum fee of $25,000 
and a maximum of $125,000 (S&P) or $130,000 (Moody's); both charge an additional 2 basis 
points on amounts above $500 million (S&P caps the amount at $200,000; it also has a one-time 
fee of $25,000 for first-time issuers).  Both offer negotiated rates for frequent issuers and offer 
quarterly charges on amounts outstanding for issuers of commercial paper. 
 S&P states that it does only solicited ratings for structured securities and non-U.S. company 
bonds.  Moody's, however, does unsolicited as well as solicited ratings of such securities. 
 By contrast, both Fitch and Duff & Phelps (before its merger with Fitch) have only done 
solicited ratings of any type of security.  With respect to corporate securities, either or both have 
been asked to provide a rating most often when the two "major" rating firms have split in their 
ratings.  Apparently, in such instances issuers hope that the additional rating will be on the more 
favorable side.  Also, Duff & Phelps did not make its ratings public unless the issuer requested that 
it do so.  The structure of both issuers' fee schedules have been similar to that of Moody's and S&P; 
but, as would be expected from firms that are perceived to be more peripheral, their fee levels have 
been lower (2.5 basis points for Fitch; 2.75 basis points for Duff & Phelps). 
 Let us return to the fee structures of Moody's and S&P.  Virtually all corporate issuers 
request a listing, believing that the opportunity to present their financial "story" directly to the rating 
firms offers a sufficiently high probability of improving their ratings (and thus lowering their 
issuing costs) so as to justify the fees. 
 At first glance, this complete or near-complete set of request-responses by issuers indicates 
that Moody's and S&P -- collectively, if not individually -- are not charging sufficiently high fees so 
as to maximize their profits.  If the demand by issuers for ratings has the "usual" properties of a 
                                                           
     26 This information is from Fridson (1999). 
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demand relationship -- at very high fees only a few issuers would request ratings, at somewhat 
lower fees more issuers would request ratings, at yet lower fees even more issuers would request 
ratings, etc. -- Moody's and S&P should be able jointly to increase their profits by raising their 
prices/fees (but consequently losing some customers) until reaching the standard monopoly 
maximizing point.27  This point is not affected by the commitment by the rating firms to rate all 
corporate issues, whether requested or not.  Under this commitment, the costs of ratings are a fixed 
obligation, and the only relevant marginal costs are the extra costs that are incurred in dealing with 
a requester. 
 So, why don't they raise their prices?  First, there may be a sharp kink in the demand curve 
at the point where the price paid just offsets the reduction in issuance costs.  But this kink would 
have to be uniform for all issuers and to be present just above 3.25 basis points for the current 
schedule to be a maximizing one.  This is possible, but it seems unlikely. 
 Second, oligopolistic rivalry (a la Bertrand28) may be such that each firm may fear that if it 
initiates a price rise, the other will not follow and the initiator will lose too much in rating fees; i.e., 
its perceived demand (given its fears that the other will not "cooperate" in a price increase) may be 
quite elastic. 
 Third, the "list price" schedule described above may be actually paid by only a few issuers, 
while the rest negotiate lower fees; i.e., the rating firms may be practicing first-degree price 
discrimination, which would yield a maximizing outcome that results in nearly all buyers' 
remaining in the market. 
 Fourth, so long as the rating firms continue to commit to rate all corporate issues, whether 
                                                           
     27  I.e., the point at which P = MC/(1+1/ED).  In this formula P is the price charged by the 
monopolist, MC is the monopolist's marginal costs, and ED is the elasticity of the demand curve 
facing the monopolist. 
     28 See, for example, Pindyk and Rubinfeld (2001, ch. 12). 
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requested or not, the ratings firms may be uneasy about seeing too many issuers drop their requests, 
since the unsolicited ratings that follow may be (or may be perceived as) less reliable, thereby 
damaging the reputations of the raters.  But, if that were true, why do the raters persist in their 
commitment to do unsolicited ratings?  Or why don't they announce that unsolicited ratings are less 
reliable than solicited ratings.29 
 In sum, the pattern of near-ubiquity of requested ratings by corporate issuers is a puzzle to 
which we can only supply some partially satisfactory answers. 
 
B.  Spread of coverage. 
 As the financial markets developed new debt instruments in the 1970s and the following 
decades, the ratings firms expanded their coverage from the corporate and municipal debt that had 
been their mainstays to these new instruments.  It appears that the smaller credit rating firms were 
more aggressive in expanding this coverage. 
                                                           
     29 On this point, Moody's and S&P appear to want to have the best of both worlds:  They aren't 
prepared to admit that unsolicited ratings are less reliable; yet their encouragement of requests and 
the concomitant sharing of issuers' information clearly indicates the opposite. 
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 V.  Performance 
 
A.  Profits. 
 The typical industrial organization assessment of performance begins with a report of 
profits.  Supra-normal profits may be an indicator of the exercise of market power,30 although the 
vagaries of accounting data require considerable caution if they are used to generate rates of return 
that are to be compared to a competitive standard.31 
 The only credit rating firm for which stand-alone profit data are available is Moody's, and 
only for 1995-2000.  In Table 3 we present Moody's profits (net income) and total assets for each of 
those years, as well as the ratio of the two and the simple average of the six years of ratios.32  As can 
be seen, the ratio ranges from 28.3% to 55.0%, with an average for the six years of 44.0%.   Even 
within the possible range of vagaries of accounting, this magnitude of return is breathtaking.  It 
certainly raises the suspicion that Moody's is able to exercise market power.33 
                                                           
     30 They may also just indicate returns to superior efficiency or intangible investments in 
intellectual capital. 
     31 See, for example, Benston (1983) and Fisher (1983). 
     32 The proposed balance sheet for Moody's for 2000 shows a negative net worth at the end of 
1999, so profits as a fraction of net worth would not be a meaningful number. 
     33 If, however, Moody's is exercising first-degree price discrimination, as was suggested as a 
possibility in Section IV, then there may be little quantity distortion arising as a consequence of this 
market power.  This argument can also be found in BIS (2000). 
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 Table 3: Net Income and Total Assets of Moody's, 1995-2000 
 ($ millions) 
 
  Net Income  Total Assets  NI/TA 
 
1995    $88.2            $217.8   40.5% 
 
1996     77.0   271.8   28.3 
 
1997    105.9   266.5   39.7 
 
1998    142.0   296.2   47.9 
 
1999    155.6   283.1   55.0 
 
2000    158.5   300 (est.)  52.8 
 
Avg., 
  1995-2000      -      -   44.0% 
 
Sources: Dun & Bradstreet (2000); Moody's website. 
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 One other issue, related to the pricing of ratings, is worthy of discussion:  As was mentioned 
in Section IV, the "list price" fee structure for Moody's and S&P involves higher fees for larger 
issues.  It seems unlikely that larger issues regularly involve larger costs of rating (although some 
larger issues may involve greater complexity, and the rating firms' legal exposure surely rises with 
issue size).  This fee structure may well be another indication of the rating firms' earning rents. 
 
B.  Innovation. 
 A second measure of performance is the extent and sources of innovation in an industry.  
There is no absolute standard against which an industry can be judged, and judgments with respect 
to innovation in the credit rating industry do seem particularly difficult. 
 It does seem to be the case, however, that innovations -- such as expanding the ratings to 
non-traditional instruments, and adding finer gradations to ratings -- have often (though not always) 
been initiated by the smaller rating firms, with the larger two then following.34  This finding, plus 
the lower fees that the smaller firms charge, indicates that competition brings the same beneficial 
effects to this industry that it does in others. 
 
C.  Moral hazard behavior. 
 For bond rating firms, the temptations for moral hazard or opportunistic behavior are 
constantly present.  A rating firm might offer to improve an issuer's rating in return for a higher fee. 
 Or it might threaten that an unsolicited rating would be substantially lower than a requested (fee-
based) rating. 
 There have not been widespread instances of such moral hazard behavior on the part of the 
rating firms.  Apparently, their institutional concerns about their long-run reputations have been 
                                                           
     34 See Cantor and Packer (1995). 
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sufficiently strong so as to keep the moral hazard tendencies in check.35 
 
D.  Efficacy. 
 Beyond the question of market power, there is the persistent question of whether the rating 
firms provide any extra information to the bond markets.  It is well known that the ratings do 
correlate well with average default rates: higher rated issues default less frequently than do lower 
rated issues.36  But this result alone is no indicator of whether the rating firms provide extra and 
useful information.  The ratings might simply be reflecting financial market outcomes (e.g., the 
interest spreads of various bond issues against comparable Treasury obligations), rather than the 
other way around. 
 Instead, a better test might be whether a change in a rating causes a significant change in 
financial market spreads (i.e., the rating change is providing new information to the financial 
markets) or whether the financial markets remain unchanged (i.e., the markets already "knew" 
about the change in the company's underlying condition that inspired the rating change).  Recent 
evidence indicates that the ratings changes do provide significant new information to the financial 
markets.37  Even this evidence, however, does not provide a definitive answer to the question of 
efficacy.  If the financial markets otherwise would have soon (say, a day later) learned anyway the 
underlying information that inspired the rating change, then the social benefits of the rating firms' 
additional information in terms of the financial markets' improved pricing of risk may not be worth 
the costs.  In addition, as is discussed in Section VI, safety-and-soundness regulators of financial 
                                                           
     35 There have been some errors in judgment -- e.g., in the Orange County debacle; see Figlewski 
and White (1995) and Jorion (1995).  And there have been allegations that Moody's has used low 
unsolicited ratings as a means to punish issuers for not requesting ratings; see Partnoy (1999). 
     36 See, for example, BIS (2000). 
     37 For a summary, see Jewell and Livingston (1999). 
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firms currently use the bond rating firms' ratings extensively for regulatory purposes.  
Consequently, a change in the rating of a bond (say, a downgrade) may cause the bond to cross a 
regulatory threshold (e.g., "investment grade") and thereby change how the regulated financial firms 
(e.g., banks, insurance companies, pension funds) treat the bond (e.g., how much capital they must 
hold, or even whether they can continue to own the bond); or the rating change brings the bond 
closer to a regulatory threshold and thereby increases the likelihood of crossing that threshold in the 
future.  Thus, the new information that the change in a rating brings to the financial markets may be 
only about the change in the bond's regulatory status rather than any new information about the 
likelihood of default.38 
 Further, the rating firms' accuracies are not perfect; there is variance around the average 
default rates embodied in each rating.39  Large variances mean greater noise and inconsistencies in 
the ratings.  Also, though the ratings do represent relative risks (on average) reasonably well, they 
are less reliable as indicators of absolute credit risks; default probabilities associated with specific 
rating levels have drifted over time.40 
                                                           
     38 To my knowledge, there are no studies that try to measure the additional information that bond 
rating firms provide to the financial markets at the time of the initial flotation of a security.  Even if 
such studies existed, however, they would still be susceptible to the interpretation problem 
described in the text:  Does a rating firm's ratings convey additional information to the financial 
markets about default probabilities, or does it just convey information about the likely regulatory 
treatment of the security? 
     39 See Altman and Saunders (2000).  As these authors explain, information about borrowers' 
defaults ought to be incorporated in the regulatory process of specifying banks' capital 
requirements, in the following way:  The expected (mean) default and loss rates that are predicted 
for a loan or an investment should be the basis for a bank's required loan-loss reserves for an asset.  
It is the unexpected defaults and losses -- the unfavorable "tail" of the distribution of returns (for 
which the variance may be a proxy) -- that should be the basis for the bank's required capital for the 
asset.  And, of course, when considering the entire portfolio of a bank, correlations of returns 
among assets must also be considered. (The inclusion of the effects of hedges is a clear example.) 
     40 See Cantor and Packer (1995). 
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 In sum, it is unclear whether the incumbent bond rating firms' continued existence passes an 
unambiguous "market test" of their value for financial market participants.  This conclusion may 
appear surprising, since the major incumbent credit rating firms have persisted and prospered.  But 
the safety-and-soundness (prudential) regulation of financial institutions in the U.S. has forced 
those institutions to make use of ratings in their purchase and holding decisions with respect to 
bonds.  Thus the rating firms have likely received an artificial lift in their business from this 
regulation.  We now turn to a more detailed discussion of regulation and how it affects the bond 
rating industry. 
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 VI.  Policy Issues (I): U.S. Financial Regulation 
 
 In Section III we briefly mentioned that the SEC since 1975 has designated rating firms as 
"nationally rated statistical rating organizations" (NRSROs) and has used this regulation to limit 
entry into the U.S. industry.  At the end of Section V we briefly discussed the safety-and-soundness 
(prudential) regulation that requires financial institutions to use the NRSROs' ratings.  We now 
consider these regulatory impacts in greater depth.  We will begin with the safety-and-soundness 
regulation. 
 
A.  Safety-and-soundness regulation. 
 The safety-and-soundness regulation of financial institutions -- notably banks and other 
depositories, insurance companies, and defined-benefit pension funds -- in the U.S. has a long 
history.  The general goal is to protect the liability holders of such institutions from the losses that 
would arise from the insolvencies of the institutions, as well as specifically to preserve the systemic 
stability of the banking system.41  As part of those schemes, regulators have attempted to limit the 
riskiness of the assets that such institutions hold.  And, beginning in 1931 regulators have grafted 
bond ratings into these limitations, either by banning the holding of securities that fall below a 
specified grade42 or by specifying capital requirements for holding the securities that are geared to 
their ratings.43  In addition, the SEC has employed the same tools for safety regulation of broker-
                                                           
     41 See, for example, White (1991a; 2001). 
     42 For example, banks and savings institutions are not permitted to hold bonds that are below 
"investment grade" (BBB) level. 
     43 For example, state insurance regulators gear the capital requirements of insurance companies 
to the risk categories -- as determined by ratings -- of the assets that they hold. 
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dealers and of money market mutual funds.44 
 The net effect of these requirements is to create a specific demand for ratings that might not 
be present in the absence of this specific manifestation of safety-and-soundness regulation.  But 
whose ratings can be used for these regulatory purposes?  Until 1975 this question remained 
unaddressed.45  In that year, however, when the SEC applied a net capital rule to broker dealers, it 
specified securities ratings as the basis for the "haircuts" (percentage reductions in the value of 
owned securities) that would be required for calculating net capital.  The SEC apparently realized 
that by specifying ratings it thereby had to address the "whose ratings" question, and it created the 
NRSRO category.  Since then, other regulatory agencies and the Congress have adopted the 
NRSRO terminology and accepted the SEC designees within that category. 
 
B.  NRSRO regulation. 
 As was discussed in Section III, the SEC last approved a new general-purpose NRSRO in 
1983; it last approved a new specialist (banks and financial institutions) NRSRO in 1992.46  
Applicants, including rating agencies that are headquartered in other countries, have applied; the 
SEC has not acted.  In essence, the SEC's behavior has raised an absolute barrier to entry, thereby 
limiting supply. 
 In 1994 and again in 1997 the SEC proposed regulations that would formalize its criteria for 
designating and monitoring NRSROs.47  The attributes of a rating firm that the SEC proposes to use 
                                                           
     44 Cantor and Packer (1995), Partnoy (1999), and BIS (2000) list the requirements by various 
regulatory authorities and by the Congress that involve the use of bond ratings. 
     45 Apparently, it was understood that the raters would be Moody's, S&P, and Fitch, the three 
incumbents. 
     46 In January 1999 it "upgraded" Thomson BankWatch from a specialist NRSRO to a general-
purpose NRSRO.  In December 2000 Thomson BankWatch was absorbed into Fitch. 
     47 The proposed criteria are those that the SEC has used less formally in its (infrequent) decisions 
  
 
25
as its criteria for designating NRSROs are as follows (the following language is taken directly from 
the proposed regulation): 
 1) national recognition, which means that the rating organization is recognized as an issuer 
of credible and reliable ratings by the predominant users of securities ratings in the United States; 
 2) adequate staffing, financial resources, and organizational structure to ensure that it can 
issue credible and reliable ratings of the debt of issuers, including the ability to operate 
independently of economic pressures or control by companies it rates and a sufficient number of 
staff members qualified in terms of education and expertise to thoroughly and competently evaluate 
an issuer's credit; 
 3) use of systematic rating procedures that are designed to ensure credible and accurate 
ratings; 
 4) extent of contacts with the management of issuers, including access to senior level 
management of the issuers; and 
 5) internal procedures to prevent misuse of non-public information and compliance with 
these procedures. 
 The SEC has taken no action on these proposals, and seems in no hurry to do so.  In the 
interim, however, the supply-limiting effect of the de facto ban on new NRSRO designations 
remains intertwined with the demand-enhancing effect of the expanding safety-and-soundness 
regulation discussed above.  It is not surprising that Moody's can earn such handsome profits in this 
environment. 
 
C.  An appraisal of NRSRO regulation. 
 It is easy to be sympathetic to the SEC's difficult task of specifying the criteria that define a 
                                                                                                                                                             
to grant a NRSRO designation.  Those designations have come through "no action" letters issued by 
the SEC staff. 
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NRSRO.  Financial regulators (including the SEC) have created a demand for ratings, but (until the 
SEC established the NRSRO category in 1975) had not themselves specified the identities and 
qualifications of the raters.  In the absence of any certifying of the competency of rating firms, there 
would be nothing to prevent the establishment of bogus "rating" firms that would indiscriminately 
offer investment grade ratings to any security at any time.  The ratings-based facet of safety-and-
soundness regulation would be wholly compromised. 
 Accordingly, so long as regulators use ratings as indicators of safety, someone will have to 
certify who is a competent rating firm.  It is to the SEC's credit that it realized that this task had to 
be done.  But this is not a task that is within the SEC's normal area of expertise.  The agency's lack 
of enthusiasm for the task is understandable -- but it is unfortunate, since it has raised the serious 
barrier to entry described above. 
 There is, however, a straightforward and superior alternative:  Safety-and-soundness 
regulators could cease relying on the rating firms for safety judgments and instead could directly 
limit financial institutions' asset risks by bringing market-based information immediately into the 
process -- for example, by specifying asset ownership limits or capital requirements based on assets' 
yield spreads directly rather than by specifying them indirectly through rating requirements.48  
Without the rating requirements by financial regulators, the SEC would not have to certify 
NRSROs, and the rating firms' fates -- incumbent and entrant alike -- would be left to the financial 
markets, where they belong.  The participants in the financial markets, on their own, would decide 
whether and which rating firms provide enough help in piercing the asymmetric information fog of 
these markets so as to justify the firms' costs and fees.49 
                                                           
     48 This has been proposed by Partnoy (1999).  If yield spreads by themselves are not a sufficient 
indicator of safety, other measures -- e.g., price volatility -- could be included as well.  The crucial 
element is that the regulators themselves should determine the criteria rather than delegating the 
decisions to rating firms. 
     49 It is worth noting that this removal of ratings from safety-and-soundness regulation has been 
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 If financial regulators insist on continuing to delegate these safety determinations to the 
rating firms, however, then someone will have to be the certifier of competent rating firms; and the 
SEC is probably as good a candidate to be a certifier as is any other financial regulatory agency.  
But then the SEC must cease being an artificial barrier to entry and must make a good faith effort to 
certify as NRSROs all capable candidates. 
 In this context, then, what criteria should the SEC use to certify NRSROs, and how do its 
1997 proposed criteria measure up?  The answer to the first question will help answer the second.  
Since the need to certify NRSROs rests on the regulators' delegation of safety decisions to the rating 
firms and on the possibility that bogus rating firms could indiscriminately distribute favorable 
ratings, the SEC must make judgments about the accuracy/efficacy/competency of a rating firm 
with respect to the relevant safety issues.  Since the rating firms focus on the likelihood of default 
with respect to specific securities and the safety-and-soundness regulators appear to be satisfied in 
relying on those judgments, the SEC will have to assess a rating firm's performance in this regard.50 
 Another way of stating this proposition is that the SEC must judge the outputs of the rating firms. 
 Against this standard, the SEC's 1997 proposed criteria do not hold up well.  The "national 
recognition" criterion appears to be an indirect market test of performance: if a rating firm was not 
performing well, it might cease to retain a national following.  But in the current context of only 
three general-purpose rating firms and a substantial regulation-driven demand for those firms' rating 
services, a national following for the current incumbents is all but guaranteed; and the task of a new 
                                                                                                                                                             
the position advocated by Moody's in its letters and filings to the SEC; see Moody's (1994; 1995; 
1998).  The same general idea has been enunciated by S&P in its comments on the initial version of 
the Basel proposal; see S&P (1999). 
     50 If this task seems too onerous for the SEC, then the agency ought seriously to consider the 
alternative: specify safety requirements directly, and exit the "certifying the certifiers" role.  Such 
action might inspire other safety-and-soundness regulators similarly to specify their safety 
requirements directly. 
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or small rating firm to attract national recognition is made substantially harder than it otherwise 
would be by its lack of a NRSRO designation while three incumbents have NRSRO designations.  
If a company executive has to decide which rating firm(s) to spend time telling his/her company's 
financial "story" to, it seems highly likely that the executive will choose an incumbent NRSRO -- 
whose favorable rating can qualify the company's securities for favorable regulatory treatment -- 
over any non-NRSRO. 
 Further, foreign credit rating firms may have substantial expertise abroad; but their lack of 
U.S. "national recognition" dooms their prospects for NRSRO designation. 
 In essence, the "national recognition" criterion creates a "Catch 22" barrier to entry.51 
 The remaining four criteria (adequate resources; systematic procedures; adequate contacts; 
internal procedures) are measures of inputs, not output.  Smaller firms or firms with innovative 
rating technologies will be at a disadvantage if judged by these criteria.52 
 In sum, if the SEC cannot or is unwilling to exit from the NRSRO designation field, then it 
must become serious about certifying qualified firms, and it must re-focus its criteria toward output-
oriented measures. 
                                                           
     51 The entry barrier nature of this criterion has also been noticed by the Antitrust Division of the 
U.S. Department of Justice; see USDOJ (1998). 
     52 Also, as the U.S. Department of Justice has pointed out, if a rating firm provides unsolicited 
ratings, as well as solicited ratings, it would appear to fail to satisfy the fourth criterion and possibly 
the third; see USDOJ (1998).  The use of unsolicited ratings should not be discouraged, so long as 
the unsolicited nature of the rating is made known. 
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 VII.  Policy Issues (II): The BIS Proposal 
 
A.  The international context. 
 The U.S. is not alone in using ratings as a basis for bank safety-and-soundness regulation.  
The BIS (2000) report includes a survey indicating that of the other eleven countries that (with the 
U.S.) are the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS),53 ten use credit 
ratings as part of bank regulation;54 of an additional six "interesting" countries55 five use ratings.56 
 Though these other countries' use of ratings is not as extensive as is found in the U.S., their 
use nevertheless raises the same question of "whose ratings?" in these countries that we addressed 
in Section VI for the U.S..  The BIS (2000) report's survey further indicates that all but one of the 
rating-using countries have explicit criteria for determining which rating firms shall be recognized 
for the country's regulatory purposes.57  The criteria reported are heavily weighted toward measuring 
inputs or the use of market recognition, similar to the criteria used by the U.S.  However, some of 
the countries have been more expansive in their recognition practices.  For example, at the time of 
the survey, the U.K. and Australia each recognized ten credit rating firms (including firms 
headquartered in the U.S., Canada, France, and Japan), and France and the Netherlands each 
recognized nine.58 
                                                           
     53 The other members are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K. 
     54 Germany does not. 
     55 Australia, Argentina, Chile, Hong Kong, Mexico, and New Zealand. 
     56 Mexico does not. 
     57 New Zealand is the exception.  New Zealand's use of ratings is through required disclosure:  A 
bank must report publicly whether or not it has a rating (and the details of the rating and the identity 
of the rater) on its senior unsecured long-term debt. 
     58 Even if the post-survey mergers among credit rating firms were taken into account, the 
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B.  Implications of the BIS "standardised approach" proposal. 
 The BIS proposal -- the "standardised approach to credit risk," which would gear banks' 
capital requirements to the credit ratings of the publicly traded debt of their borrowers -- will clearly 
increase greatly the demand for ratings in the U.S and the other BCBS countries, as well as in other 
countries that want to follow the Basel guidelines.  Though the greater "granularity" and risk 
sensitivity for banks' capital requirements provided by the BIS proposal is certainly a welcome 
improvement over the 1988 Basel Accord,59 the "standardised approach" raises the same central 
issues of certification of credit rating firms that currently bedevil the U.S. 
 The BIS recognizes that the reliability of the credit rating firms -- the BIS uses the phrase 
"external credit rating institutions" (ECAIs) -- is crucial for the "standardised approach" to be 
effective and that bank regulators must certify the ECAIs.  The proposal specifies six criteria that an 
ECAI must satisfy:60 
 
 1) Objectivity: rigorous methodology and historical validity of its credit assessments; 
 
 2) Independence: not subject to economic or political pressures; 
 
 3) International access/transparency: assessments available to both domestic and foreign 
institutions; the general methodology should be publicly available; 
 
 4) Disclosure: both qualitative (e.g., definition of default, time horizon) and quantitative 
(actual default rates in each assessment category; transition rates from one assessment category to 
another over time); 
 
 5) Resources: sufficient resources to carry out high quality credit assessments, including on-
going contacts with the managements of the assessed entities; assessments to be based on 
                                                                                                                                                             
numbers of recognized firms would be seven and six, respectively. 
     59 See BIS (1988). 
     60 See BIS (2001b). 
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methodologies combining qualitative and quantitative approaches; and 
 
 6) Credibility: independent parties' use of assessments; existence of internal procedures to 
prevent the misuse of confidential information. 
 Though the BIS is somewhat more sensitive to "output" considerations (e.g., historical 
validity of an ECAI's methods) than are the SEC's proposed regulations, the proposal is 
nevertheless heavily oriented toward specifying inputs and thus will tend to favor large incumbents 
over smaller innovative entrants.  Adoption of the BIS proposal in its current form is thus likely to 
raise worldwide barriers to entry into the credit rating industry. 
 
C.  Alternatives to the BIS "standardised approach" proposal. 
 As was true for the SEC's proposed NRSRO regulations, there are superior alternatives to 
the BIS's proposal.  At a minimum, the BIS should reformulate its criteria for certification so that 
they focus exclusively on outputs, not on inputs. 
 More fundamentally, the extended regulation/certification of credit rating firms by the 
SEC's counterparts abroad, as well as by the SEC, which is an unavoidable part of the BIS proposal, 
is not a sensible direction for bank regulation to go, for the reasons discussed above.  Instead, to 
deal with credit risk issues and with bank capital issues more broadly, the BIS's approach to bank 
capital requirements should proceed as follows: 
 First, to the extent that a bank's borrower has traded debt securities outstanding, the 
pricing/spreads of those securities should be directly incorporated into the capital requirement for 
the bank's loans to that borrower.  Second, bank regulators should require that all banks use market 
value accounting (MVA) for all of their assets, liabilities, and off-balance-sheet items, in place of 
the largely backward-looking cost-oriented accounting system of generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) that prevails today.61  MVA reports ought to be expected from banks on a far 
                                                           
     61 See White (1991a, 1991b, 1998) for further discussion. 
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more frequent basis than the current end-of-quarter basis; after all, banks do not get into trouble 
solely on the last day of each quarter.  The eventual goal in a digital era ought to be real-time 
reporting. 
 Third, as a supplement to MVA, bank regulators must require forward-looking stress tests 
to be part of banks' capital requirements.  Stress tests ought to be part of the auditor's obligation.62  
The accounting profession ought to be able to look to the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) in the U.S and/or the International Accounting Standards Committee for guidance in 
developing stress-test standards.  Fourth, in conjunction with a focus on stress tests, bank regulators 
ought to refocus their concerns about capital to the following paradigm concerning the riskiness of 
assets:  Loan loss reserves are intended to protect the bank's solvency against the expected (mean) 
losses associated with an asset; capital is intended to protect the bank's solvency against the 
unexpected losses (the unfavorable tail of the distribution of possible losses) associated with an 
asset.63   Fifth, subordinated debt ought to be part of banks' required capital structure.64 
                                                           
     62 Since accountants are already certified, no new regulatory/certification mechanisms would be 
necessary. 
     63 And, of course, with respect to the capital required for a bank's overall portfolio, correlations 
among asset returns must be considered. 
     64 For further discussion of subordinated debt, see Federal Reserve System and U.S. Department 
of the Treasury (2000). 
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 VII.  Conclusion 
 
 The industrial organization of the credit rating industry is an important area for future 
research, especially in the international arena.  This essay has only scratched the surface. 
 Nevertheless, the analysis of this paper has revealed the important role that regulation plays 
in this industry: by increasing the demand for ratings, and by limiting the supply of rating firms.  
The Basel proposal will only exacerbate the demand for ratings but not solve the problem of how 
credit rating firms should be certified. 
 There is a better way.  It would make more extensive use of market information.  It would 
use market spreads directly as indicators of the riskiness of assets, and it would use market value 
accounting, forward-looking stress tests, and subordinated debt as vital components of the process 
of determining adequate capital for banks. 
 These suggestions do not mean that the credit rating firms should be prevented from playing 
a continuing role in helping issuers and investors pierce the fog of asymmetric information.  But 
that role should be determined by the market participants themselves, not by additional regulation 
that artificially increases demand and restricts supply.  The latter is a recipe for shortages and rents. 
 This is not a welcome prospect. 
  
 
34
 References 
 
Altman, Edward I. and Anthony Saunders, "An Analysis and Critique of the BIS Proposal on 
 Capital Adequacy and Ratings," Department of Finance, Stern School of Business, New 
 York University, January 2000, mimeo. 
 
Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, "International 
 Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards," July 1988. 
 
Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, "A New Capital 
 Adequacy Framework," Consultative Paper, June 1999. 
 
Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, "Credit Ratings 
 and Complementary Sources of Credit Quality Information," Working Paper No. 3,  August 
2000. 
 
Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, "Overview of the 
 New Basel Capital Accord," Consultative Document, January 2001a. 
 
Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, "The Standardised 
 Approach to Credit Risk," Supporting Document to the New Basel Capital Accord, 
 Consultative Document, January 2001b. 
 
Benston, George J., "Accounting Numbers and Economic Values," Antitrust Bulletin, 27 (Spring 
 1982), pp. 161-215. 
 
Carlton, Dennis W. and Jeffrey M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization, 2nd edn. New  York: 
HarperCollins, 1994. 
 
Cantor, Richard and Frank Packer, "The Credit Rating Industry," Journal of Fixed Income, 5 
 (December 1995), pp. 10-34. 
 
Dun & Bradstreet Corporation, "Information Sheet: The New D&B Corporation; Moody's 
 Corporation," September 20, 2000. 
 
Ederington, Louis H., and Jess B. Yawitz, "The Bond Rating Process," in Edward I. Altman, 
 ed., Handbook of Financial Markets and Institutions, 6th edn. New York: John Wiley 
 & Sons, 1987, pp. 23-1 - 23-7. 
 
Federal Reserve System and U. S. Department of the Treasury, "The Feasibility and Desirability 
 of Mandatory Subordinated Debt," December 2000. 
 
Figlewski, Stephen and Lawrence J. White, "Orange County: Don't Blame Derivatives," 
  
 
35
 SternBusiness, 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 30-35. 
 
Fisher, Franklin M., "The Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return: Reply," American Economic 
 Review, 74 (June 1984), pp. 509-517. 
 
Fisher, Franklin M. and John J. McGowan, "On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to 
 Infer Monopoly Profits," American Economic Review, 73 (March 1983), pp. 82-97. 
 
Fridson, Martin S., "Why Do Bond Rating Agencies Exist?" Extra Credit (Merrill Lynch), 
 November/December 1999. 
 
Jewell, Jeff and Miles Livingston, "A Comparison of Bond Ratings from Moody's S&P and  Fitch," 
Financial Markets, Institutions, & Instruments, Vol. 8, No. 4, August 1999. 
 
Jorion, Philippe, Big Bets Gone Bad: Derivatives and Bankruptcy in Orange County. San Diego: 
 Academic Press, 1995. 
 
Moody's, "Letter to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission," December 5, 1994. 
 
Moody's, "Letter to SEC Commissioner Stephen M.H. Wallman," October 6, 1995. 
 
Moody's, "Letter to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission," March 2, 1998. 
 
Partnoy, Frank, "The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit 
 Rating Agencies," Washington University Law Quarterly, 77 No. 3 (1999), pp. 619-712. 
 
Pindyk, Robert S. and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, 5th edn. Upper Saddle River,  N.J.: 
Prentice Hall, 2001. 
 
Scherer, F.M. and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. 3rd ed. 
 Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1990. 
 
Standard & Poor's, "Standard & Poor's Official Response to the Basel Committee's Proposal," 
 December 1999. 
 
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, "Comments of the United States department of 
 Justice before the Securities and Exchange Commission," March 6, 1998. 
 
White, Lawrence J., The S&L Debacle: Public Policy Lessons for Bank and Thrift Regulation. 
 New York: Oxford University Press, 1991a. 
 
White, Lawrence J., "The Value of Market Value Accounting for the Deposit Insurance 
 System," Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance, 6 (April 1991b), pp. 284-301. 
  
 
36
 
White, Lawrence J., "Getting a Grip on Capital," Secondary Mortgage Markets, 15 (July 1998), 
 pp. 1, 54-59. 
 
White, Lawrence J., "Bank Regulation in the U.S.: Lessons from the 1980s and 1990s," Japan 
 and the World Economy, (forthcoming 2001). 
 
Wilson, Richard S., Corporate Senior Securities: Analysis and Evaluation of Bonds,  Convertibles 
and Preferreds. Chicago: Probus, 1987. 
